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SOME PERCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS ON TALKING ABOUT SPACE 
WILLEM J.M. LEVELT
Talking about space is often notoriously difficult.
Take, for instance, giving a route direction. Mary asks 
a bypasser, Peter, to tell her how to get to the Central 
Station. If Peter wants to be helpful, and the Central 
Station is not in view, he will have to retrieve his 
"cognitive map" of the relevant part of town, locate the 
present position and the destination, trace the shortest 
or easiest route between them, find relevant landmarks 
such as churches, towers, shops along the route, retrieve 
names or descriptions for these landmarks, and for the 
directions from one landmark to the next, such as 
’straight on”, "to the left", etc., express these in the 
right order, check with Mary whether she understands it 
all, etc. (cf. Klein, 1982 for a detailed theoretical and 
empirical analysis of route direction tasks). It is 
common knowledge that the success rate of route 
directions is not very high. Mary will probably have to 
repeat her request once or twice before she finally 
reaches the station.
Or consider describing one's apartment. Even a careful 
apartment description is a poor substitute for perceiving 
the apartment, and a speaker knows this intuitively. The 
description task is so difficult because it requires the 
speaker to select for expression a very small subset from 
a sheer infinitude of information he has available about 
his apartment. Another major problem in this task is how 
to order what has been selected for expression: where to 
start with the description (at the front door?), what to 
mention next (the hallway?, a major room?). Most people 
develop some sort of touring strategy, deciding on the 
order of mention by spatial connectivity as if they are 
walking around through the apartment (Linde and Labov, 
1975). This "linearization problem" in talking about 
space has been further analyzed in experimental studies 
by Levelt (1981, 1982a) and by Ehrich and Koster (1983).
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One could argue that the difficulty in these two exam­
ples is primarily one of memory. Both the route and the 
apartment descriptions involve retrieving and manipulat­
ing mental representations; they don't demonstrate that 
there is any principled difficulty in mapping space on 
language. But talking about space can still be highly 
problematic in the absence of any strain on memory, 
namely, in the case where the spatial relations are 
perceptually given. Most people are aware of occasional 
trouble in the use of ,!left" and "right” which can even 
arise when the scene is in full view. Less well known 
is the potential trouble in referring to the other two 
spatial dimensions, ,!in front of "/"behind" and "above"/ 
"below". This article will analyze some of the sources 
of trouble which may arise when these terms are used for 
referring to perceptual scenes, and in doing so shed some 
light on the ways in which perceptual relations restrict 
or limit the uses of language.
The theoretical purpose is, more in particular, to 
compare two systems of spatial reference, the so-called 
deictic and intrinsic ways of referring, and to specify 
how these systems differ from the formal and the percep­
tual points of view. This will initially be done by a 
detailed analysis of the first major dimension of spa­
tial reference, denoted by "left" versus "right". We 
will then move to the second major dimension, and inves­
tigate the uses of "in front of"/"behind". It will pro­
vide us with a hitherto unknown perceptual restriction 
on the intrinsic system, which will be called "the 
principle of canonical orientation". This principle will 
turn out to play a major role in the analysis of the 
last and most basic dimension, indicated by the terms 
"above" and "below". There is, of course, much more to 
say about the semantics and pragmatics of spatial rela­
tion terms. The reader is referred to Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976) for a more comprehensive analysis.
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1. "LEFT" AND "RIGHT", DEICTIC AND INTRINSIC USE
It is easy to create confusion with "lef.t" and "right". 
Consider first Figure la. With the present text in normal 
reading position, there can be no doubt that the ball 
labelled "A" is to the left of the ball labelled "B", 
and that B is to the right of A.
(a) (b ) (c) (d)
B
V V
A
B
A
Figure 1. Deictic aYid intrinsic uses of "left" and 
"right
It is a bit more precise to say that the above holds 
for a viewer positioned at V in the figure, having A 
and B in full frontal view. In the following, V will be 
used as a symbol for the directed eye(s) of the viewer. 
We will further use the following terminological con­
vention: in the cases to be analyzed there is always a 
"located object" and a "referent object". In the expres­
sion "A is to the left of B", for instance, A is the 
located object, and B is the referent object. In "B is 
to the right of A", B is the located object, and A the 
referent object. The roles of the objects involved will 
mostly be clear from the context, but the explicit 
terminology will here and there be needed.
Turning now to Figure lb, one can observe the first 
trouble with "left" and "right". As in Figure la the 
viewer is justified in saying that B is to the right of
A, but it would not be false to say that B is to A Ts 
left, since B sits at A's left hand. So, B is both to 
the right and to the left of A. Are these uses dependent
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on the position of the viewer? To test this, consider 
Figure lc. The viewer of Figure la has walked around 
balls A and B and watches them from behind, so to speak. 
From this perspective, B is unambiguously to the left of
A, and A is to the right of B. In other words, the 
relations are the reverse of those in Figure la; changing 
the viewer's perspective does affect the use of "left” 
and "right". When the viewer of Figure lb walks around
A and B to end up in the position depicted in Figure Id, 
the ambiguity in the use of "left" and "right" disap­
pears. B is to the left of A, and A is to the right of
B, there is no other way.
The cause of these shifts and ambiguities is well-known. 
Language users have (at least) two systems of referring 
to spatial relations, the deictic system and the intrin- 
sic system. When a speaker uses the deictic system, he 
interprets spatial terms relative to his own perspective. 
This system is exclusively used in Figures la and lc. 
Changing the speaker’s perspective changes the choice of 
"left" and "right" accordingly. Notice that a listener 
who heard the speaker’s spatial description would not be 
able to interpret it correctly without knowing the 
speaker’s position vis-à-vis the scene. The deictic 
system may have been designed for communication situa­
tions where the interlocutors are aware of one an­
other’s perspective. Throughout this paper, however, we 
will assume that the viewer/speaker more or less coin­
cides with the listener in terms of location and orien­
tation. It may well be the case that the uses of spatial 
terms vary with the spatial relations between speaker 
and listener, given the scene. This will, however, not 
be explored here.
Turning now to Figures lb and Id, one should, firstly, 
observe that the viewer could also use the deictic 
system. He will then come up with the same terms as the 
viewer in Figures la and lc, respectively. But there is 
another possibility in Figures lb and Id, namely to use 
the intrinsic system. In this system of reference 
spatial terms are interpreted relative to the intrinsic 
orientation of the referent objects themselves. In 
Figures lb and Id person A is oriented in such a way
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that B is at his left hand. This state of affairs is 
independent of the viewer's perspective; it holds in lb 
as well as in Id. In order to use the intrinsic system 
the language user must be able to interpret the scene.
It must be clear what sorts of objects the scene con­
tains. If the viewer in Figure lb lost his glasses a 
moment before the experiment, he might not be able to see 
that A and B are sitting persons. If he perceives A as 
a bag of potatoes, he could not felicitously say that B 
is to the left of A. His only recourse would be to use 
the deictic system, and say that B is to the right of
A. The deictic system can always be used; it is the 
default system, but it requires the listener to know 
where the speaker is. The intrinsic system not only 
requires interpretation of the scene, but it can also 
only be used when there are referent objects with an 
intrinsic orientation, such as persons, cars, churches, 
chairs, telephones, etc. It will not work for balls, 
round or square tables, trees, heaps of sand, etc. (at 
least not for "left”, ’right", "in front of", or 
"behind"). This is why objects A and B were drawn as 
circles in Figures la and lc; they do not allow for 
intrinsic interpretation.
The ambiguity observed in Figure lb is now explainable. 
The deictic system and the intrinsic system are in full 
opposition. The conflict disappears, however, when the 
viewer moves to the position depicted in Figure Id. 
There, B is to the left of A both from the viewer's 
perspective (the deictic system) and given A's orien­
tation (the intrinsic system).
This duplicity of systems for spatial reference is 
quite general for the languages of the world, though 
there are many differences of detail (see, for instance, 
Weissenborn and Klein, 1982). This gives rise to several 
important questions. The hardest one is why linguistic 
evolution has provided us with this duplicity. Do the 
two systems serve different functions? Also do the two 
systems derive from a common source which is phylogene- 
tically or ontogenetically prior to their separate 
developments? A second issue is how language users deal 
with potential confusion between the systems. How can a
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hearer know which system a speaker is using? Are there 
any perceptual or linguistic cues which reveal to the 
listener which system is in operation? A third set of 
problems concerns the internal structure of the systems. 
Have they any marked mathematical and perceptual proper­
ties? Does the same duplicity hold for the "in front of"/ 
"behind" dimension and for "above"/"below", and, if so, 
how are these three related? The present paper will 
mainly address this third set of issues by giving a 
phenomenological account of the systems1 properties. 
Still, in a concluding section some attention will be 
given to the first two issues.
2. CONVERSENESS AND TRANSITIVITY IN DEICTIC VERSUS 
INTRINSIC USE OF "LEFT" AND "RIGHT"
Are "left" and "right" converse relations, i.e., is it 
the case that if A is to the left of B, B is to the right 
of A? Notice that the property of converseness can be 
crucial for the interpretation of spatial descriptions. 
Peter leaves the office to pick somebody up at the 
station, but his car refuses to start. Peter returns 
from the parking place to the office building and asks 
Mary whether he can use her car. Mary gives him her key, 
and knowing that Peter is probably unfamiliar with her 
car, adds "you parked your car just to the right of 
mine". Peter is likely to conclude that Mary's car is 
to the left of his, but this conclusion is only correct 
if converseness holds. It doesn't, as we will see, and 
Peter might have to return for further help.
Converseness holds only for the deictic system. The 
viewer's perspective in Figure la, repeated as Figure 
2a, guarantees that B is to the right of A, and that A 
is to the left of B. There is no possibility that the 
one relation holds without the other holding as well.
But compare this to the situation in Figure 2b. An 
intrinsic interpretation is possible here (and in order 
to indicate that this is the intended interpretation we 
left out the viewer, whose position is irrelevant in the
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V
(c) (d)
V
2 (c)
A is to the left of B 
B is to the left of C
2 (d)
A is to the left of B 
B is to the left of C
A is to the left of C A is to the right of C
Figure 2. Converseness and transitivity for deictic 
and intrinsic "left" and "right".
intrinsic system). B is to the right of A in this figure, 
but A is not to the left of B. In fact, A is to the 
right of B. So, A and B are to the right of one another;
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there is no converseness. It is easy to see that such a 
situation can also arise with PeterTs and Mary's parked 
cars above. If they are parked in opposite directions, 
similar to A and B in Figure 2b, each car is to the 
right of the other one. A more detailed analysis of 
converseness, called MantonymyM there, can be found in 
Ehrich (1983).
What about transitivity? The two systems differ in this 
respect as well. The deictic system is locally transi­
tive, as is illustrated in Figure 2c. From the viewer's 
perspective A is to the left of B, and B is to the left 
of C; it is then necessarily also the case that A is to 
the left of C. But the intrinsic system is not transi­
tive. Figure 2d, if interpreted intrinsically, i.e., 
independent of a viewer's perspective, has A to the 
left of B, B to the left of C, but not A to the left 
of C; A is, rather, to C's right.
That the intrinsic system is locally intransitive is 
unknown in the literature, and it has led to considerable 
confusion. Johnson-Laird (1980, p. 87), in discussing 
transitivity for "right", tacitly passes from the deic­
tic to the intrinsic system, and then notices that the 
transitivity of "on the right" may break down over ex­
tended chains of objects, such as people sitting around 
a large circular table, and essentially the same argu­
ment is made in Johnson-Laird (1983, pp. 240-241). The 
fact of the matter is, however, that the intrinsic 
system is not even locally transitive, as appears from 
Figure Id, but that the deictic system would stay 
fully transitive for a viewer who observes the round 
table from a distance.
One consequence of the intrinsic system's local intran­
sitivity is that it is hard to reason with "left" and 
"right" within the intrinsic system. If one would ask a 
person to draw the correct spatial arrangement from the 
description "John is to the left of Mary, Mary is to 
the left of Peter, and John is to the right of Peter", 
i.e., the arrangement depicted in Figure Id, it will 
take a long time to find the correct solution (one is 
likely to come up with the quasi-solution of arranging 
the three persons evenly around a circular table).
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Johnson-Laird (1980, 1983) has correctly observed that 
in order to reason with ’left” and "right” more is 
needed than logical deduction from the meaning of these 
terms; one has to create so-called "mental models”, 
images of arrangements in which one can shift objects 
around until the conditions are fulfilled.
3. PERCEPTUAL LIMITATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE USE OF 
THE DEICTIC AND INTRINSIC SYSTEMS
The deictic system requires a viewer's perspective, 
and one may ask what limiting conditions this perspec­
tive has to adhere to. In Figure 3a the viewer is 
standing upright watching two balloons over the horizon. 
Here it is unambiguously the case that A is to the 
left of B, and B to the right of A. The viewer can also 
watch the balloons while lying on his side, as in 
Figure 3b. This variation is necessary for testing 
whether it is critical for the use of deictic "right" 
and "left" that the objects are arranged parallel to the 
eye's horizontal meridian. In Figure 3b the viewer has 
the line B-A parallel to the vertical meridians of his 
retinas. Some excercise on the sofa tells me that it 
is less obvious to say that B is to the right of A in 
such cases, but it is probably still possible. It would 
surely be impossible, for instance, to say that B is 
above A in this case.
But now eliminate the visual frame, i.e., the horizon. 
If the balloons hang in a blank Ganzfeld and the viewer 
is upright, as in Figure 3c, A is again unambiguously 
to the left of B, and B is to the right of A. A visual 
frame of orientation is apparently not obligatory for 
the deictic assignment of "right" and "left". But the 
viewer still has two other cues here. The objects are 
arranged parallel to the retinas' horizontal meridian, 
and the vestibular system tells the viewer that this 
arrangement is orthogonal to gravity. Let us remove 
the first cue and put the viewer on his side, as in 
Figure 3d. Is A still to the left of B in this case?
Perceptual limitations on talking about space
331
W. J. M. Levelt
(a ) (b) (c)
A B A B A B
(d (e) ( f )
B B
Figure 3. Perceptual cues for deictic use of "left" 
and "right".
Intuitions waver, but some more looking at a white wall 
from the sofa convinced me that it is a bit odd to say 
that A is to the left of B, whereas it is probably
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possible to say that A is below B.
In order to test which cue is the more important one, 
gravity (which tells the viewer about the "objective” 
horizontal arrangement) or retinal arrangement, one must 
test the case depicted in Figure 3 e , and compare it to 
3d. In 3e the vestibular information tells the viewer 
that the balloons are not arranged in a horizontal plane, 
though they are still aligned parallel to the retinas' 
horizontal meridian. I feel one could say ”B is to the 
right of A” in this case which would indicate dominance 
of the retinal over the vestibular information. But if 
the vestibular information is further assisted by an 
orienting visual frame, such as the horizon in Figure 3f, 
it is very odd to say that B is to the right of A.
Balloon B is below A in this case.
Table 1 summarizes the observations made so far. It 
lists for each of the situations in Figure 3 whether or 
not one can say "B is to the right of A” (plus a ”?” 
for the two somewhat doubtful cases); it also marks for 
each case whether the line A-B is in a horizontal plane 
given (a) vestibular information, (b) visual frame in­
formation, and (c) retinal information, i.e., parallel­
ism to the retinas' horizontal meridian.
Perceptual limitations on talking about space
TABLE I. The appropriateness of saying "B is to the right of A" for different 
combinations of perceptual cues.
"B is to the right of A" F igure Perceptual Cue 
Vestibular Visual Frame Retinal Orient
Appropriate Fig.3a + + +
Fig.3b + + —
Fig.3c + 0 +
?
• Fig.3e — 0 +
Inappropriate
?
• Fig.3d + 0 —
Fig.3f — — +
It is clear from this table that not all possible 
cases have been studied. The vestibular and visual frame 
cues are essentially three-valued: they can be of the 
type "A-B is horizontally aligned", "A-B is vertically 
aligned", or the cue can be missing (for the vestibular 
system the latter can only be arranged in a space craft
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or in free fall). The retinal information is two-valued, 
horizontal or vertical. Boolean combination gives, 
therefore, 18 possible relations between cues. Figure
3 and Table 1 present only 6 of them. The study of most 
other cases requires more complex arrangements than the 
private facilities used so far; the space craft mentioned 
and a tiltable room would be helpful.
For the present our conclusions must be based on the 
information in Table 1, and the simplest summary of 
these results is that in the deictic system one can 
confidently express a spatial relation as "right" or 
"left" if there is agreement in a horizontal direction 
between at least two of the three cues. If two of the 
three cues conspire in the vertical direction, as in 
3f, one can equally confidently use "above" or "below". 
The table strongly suggests that none of the cues is a 
necessary condition for deictic use of "left" and 
"right". Or, more precisely, none of the cues neces­
sarily has to be positive; the other ones can always 
compensate. The table leaves some doubt in this respect 
for the vestibular case, since the one negative case
(e) is doubtful and the other one (f) does not allow 
for "left" and "right". But a Gedanken-experiment can 
help here. If one would arrange two balls, A and B, 
on one's desk in such a way that B is to the right of 
A from one's own perspective, then it would probably 
not matter much if the whole room would be orbiting 
the earth: B will still be perceived as being to the 
right of A. Another, but related question is whether a 
single cue's negative information can disrupt the 
system. Table 1 only answers this for the retinal cue; 
if A-B is arranged vertically over the retina, as in 
3b, the other two cues can overrule this. But it would 
be premature to answer the question for negative ves­
tibular or visual frame information.
Let us now turn to some conditions which have to be
met for the intrinsic system to operate. As was dis­
cussed earlier, the use of the intrinsic system 
requires interpretation of the scene, and in particular 
of the identity of the objects involved. In order to 
say that B is to the right of A, one must recognize
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that the referent object A has an intrinsic right side. 
But this is not a perceptual fact per s e . Consider, for 
instance, some objects which we take to have a right and 
a left side: people, different types of animals, cars, 
churches, chairs, desks, etc. These objects do not share 
any perceptual properties. There is only a loose func­
tional relationship between them which we recognize 
through extensive experience. The left/right structure 
of people and (most) animals is probably an interpreta- 
tion-by-analogy to our own left/right structure; the 
main sense organs are up/front, and that is how the 
organism is oriented in its world. From this we can 
derive what is left and right. Cars, churches, chairs, 
desks derive their left/right organization from the 
ways human beings are typically oriented towards them 
when they are used. This can lead to interesting com­
plications. Figure 4 represents a desk and a chair, and 
for each of them it is indicated what is intrinsic left, 
front, and right.
Figure 4. Different arrangements of intrinsic "left", 
"front"> and "right" for a chair and a desk.
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It should be noticed that for the chair, left, front, 
and right are related in the same way as for people. For 
the desk, however, left and right are reversed with 
respect to what is front. This can only be understood 
if one takes into account what is the canonical position 
of a person using chair and desk. For both objects, 
"right" is what is right for that person, and "left" 
is what is left for that person. For the chair, "front" 
is where that person is facing, but for the desk,
"front" is the side facing the person. We will return 
to this latter fact in the next section. For a full 
treatment of these aspects of the intrinsic system, see 
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976).
The use of the intrinsic system is independent of the 
speaker's position with respect to the scene. So far we 
have observed that 'the intrinsic system is independent 
of the speaker's perspective; it is in the first place 
knowledge-based, whereas the deictic system is percep- 
tion-based. We will shortly have to add a slight but 
interesting qualification to the effect that certain 
conditions of perspective have to be fulfilled as well 
before the intrinsic system can be used. This will be 
discussed at the end of the next section.
4. DEICTIC AND INTRINSIC USE OF "IN FRONT OF" ("BEFORE") 
AND "BEHIND"
The front/back dimension can also be referred to both 
deictically and intrinsically, and consequently problems 
arise which are quite similar to those encountered for 
the left/right dimension. Still, we are usually less 
aware of potential trouble with front/back than we are 
with respect to left/right. This is largely because the 
front/back dimension is functionally and morphologically 
asymmetrical, whereas left/right is largely symmetrical 
in these respects. The meaning of "in front of"/"behind" 
is related to the biologically highly important dis­
tinction between "closer to me" and "further from me", 
and to the distinction between the front side and the
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back side of the body (see Clark, 1973 for a thorough 
analysis of these issues). Nothing of equal functional 
and morphological importance goes with the distinction 
between left and right. It is very hard to become aware 
of the existing asymmetries of the human body since they 
are mostly internal and irrelevant for information 
exchange with the environment. Only a sufficient degree 
of right- or left-handedness provides a person with 
some degree of functional information about what is 
left and what is right, or as Corballis and Beale (1976) 
put it: "It is probably his handedness which first 
informs the child about the difference between left 
and right" (p. 175). This small privilige would thus be 
denied to ambidexters, and the reader is referred to 
Corballis and Beale (op. cit.) for a review of the 
evidence which relates left-right confusion to lack of 
dominance or lateralization.
Let us first consider the properties of converseness 
and transitivity for "in front of" ("before") and 
"behind". Figure 5a is a bird's-eye view of two static 
balloons and a viewer. The three are roughly aligned.
Let us assume here, and for the cases to follow, that 
all objects are in sight for the viewer.
Under these conditions B is in front of A, and A is 
situated behind B. Converseness seems to hold here, and 
I have not been able to construct deictic cases where 
it breaks down. Figure 5b can be given intrinsic inter­
pretation. In that case the position of the viewer is 
irrelevant, and A and B have an orientation of their 
own. Clearly, B sits in front of A, and A sits in front 
of B; there is no converseness. One could, of course, 
orient A and B in such a way that A is in front of B 
and B is behind A, but the point to be made is that 
"in front of" and "behind" do not bear a necessarily 
converse relation within the intrinsic system, whereas 
they presumably do in the deictic system.
Before turning to transitivity, an important observa­
tion made by Hill (1982) should be reported. Hill noticed 
that not all languages use the equivalents of "in 
front of" and "behind" in the way discussed for Figure 
5a. The Afro-Asiatic language Hausa, for instance,
Perceptual limitations on talking about space
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(a) (b) (c)
V
5 (c)
A is in front of B 
B is in front of c
5 (d)
A is in front of B 
B is in front of C
A is in front of C A is behind C
Figure 5. Converseness and transitivity for deictic 
and intrinsic "in front of" and "behind" .
requires the viewer in that situation to say that A 
is in front of B, at least if A is clearly visible. 
Hill calls Hausa an "aligning" language. It is as if B 
is "oriented" towards A in just the same way as the 
viewer is oriented towards A; A is in front of B just
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as it is in front of the viewer. English, Dutch, and 
many other languages are different, they are ’facing1' 
languages. It is as if B is facing the viewer, so that 
A is behind B. Still, it is probably the case that 
within an aligning language the converseness property 
holds for the deictic system, as it does for a ’facing” 
language.
The deictic system is also transitive for "before” and 
"behind”. This is depicted in Figure 5c. A is in front 
of B, B is in front of C, and A is in front of C. I 
found no way to violate this for the deictic system.
It is easy, however, to violate transitivity for the 
intrinsic system. This is done in Figure 5d, which is 
constructed in analogy to Figure 2d. A is in front of
B, B is in front of C, but A is behind C. The lack of 
converseness and transitivity for "before”/’behind” in 
the intrinsic system may complicate reasoning with these 
terms in the same way as was observed above for reason­
ing with intrinsic ’left” and ’right”.
Turning now to a discussion of some perceptual condi­
tions on the deictic use of ’before” and ’behind”, we 
must first correct some noticeable confusion in the 
literature. Earlier we described the objects A and B in 
Figure 5a as static objects. Hill (1982) observed that 
the deictic use of "before” (”in front of”) and "behind” 
depends on whether A and B are static or dynamic. His 
argument is illustrated in Figure 6.
Figure 6a is a copy of Figure 5a, it shows the viewer 
and the static objects A and B. Remember that B is in 
front of A for the viewer. Figure 6b is the same, 
except for the arrows which indicate that A and B are 
moving away from the viewer. Hill observed that in this 
case A is in front of B, and B is behind A. Though the 
observation is entirely correct, the interpretation 
is not.
Consider, first, Figure 6c which is the same again, 
except for the reversal of the directions of motion.
Now, the situation is the same again as in Figure 6a:
B is in front of A, and A is behind B. So it is not the 
dynamic character of the scene that dictates the reversal 
of "in front of" and "behind", as Hill supposes. It
339
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V V v V
Figure 6. Deictic and intrinsic use of static and 
dy'^ a^mic scenes.
depends, rather, on the direction of motion. More im­
portant, however, is that the viewer’s position is 
irrelevant. Whether the viewer watches A Ts and B ’s 
moving from a perspective as in Figure 6b, or from 
one as in 6d, A will always be in front of B, and B 
will be behind A. But if the use of ”in front of" and 
"behind" are independent of the viewer’s position, we 
are quite probably operating in the intrinsic system, 
and not in the deictic system as Hill supposes (and 
Ehrich 1983 with him). Objects without intrinsic fronts 
acquire a front by moving; the front is the most forward 
side of the object in motion. This predicts that the 
deictic property of converseness doesn’t necessarily 
hold for such moving objects. Figure 6e shows that this 
is correct. Here A is moving towards B, and B is moving 
in opposite direction towards A. It can doubtless be 
said in this situation that B is in front of A, and A 
is in front of B.
The relevance of H i l l’s observation is that certain 
stimulus conditions, such as those in Figure 6b, can 
make it hard to use the deictic system; the language 
user is almost forced to switch to the intrinsic system. 
Ehrich (1983) has made a related observation for a 
situation resembling Figure 5b. It is exceedingly hard
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to use the deictic system in a case like that one. If 
the observer would be in the same position with respect 
to A and B as the viewer in 5a, it would be very hard 
to say that A is behind B, although that would be 
correct in the deictic system. In other words, if a 
referent object has an intrinsic front, either by itself 
or acquired through movement, there is a very strong 
tendency to use the intrinsic system for "in front of" 
and "behind". This clearly differs from the case of 
"left" and "right": the situation of Figure lb allows 
equally well for deictic and intrinsic use of these 
terms. Such a balance does not arise in the situation 
of Figure 5b. I will return to this issue in the final 
section of this paper.
Returning now to deictic use, and asking ourselves 
what stimulus conditions have to be fulfilled in order 
to say that A is in front of B, we arrive at the normal 
cues for depth perception. Handbooks of visual percep­
tion, such as Kaufman (1974), give extensive reviews 
of these cues which need not be repeated here. The 
viewer in Figure 6a can derive that B is in front of A 
by considering occlusion relations between A and B, by 
using stereopsis or movement parallax, by comparing 
the visual angles covered by A and B, etc. It is not 
wholly irrelevant for the use of deictic terminology 
which cue is the effective one. HillTs (op. cit.) 
observation that for a speaker of Hausa B is behind A 
in the situation of Figure 6a only holds if A and B 
are both clearly visible. If B occludes A, but the 
speaker knows that A is at the other side of B, then 
A is said to be "behind" B.
Occlusion also seems to play a special role in the use 
of "before"/"behind" in English (and, mutatis mutandis, 
for other languages, such as Dutch and German). How­
ever, this has to do with the distinction between 
horizontal and vertical arrangements. Remember that 
there were clear conditions on horizontality for the 
plane A/B/viewer as far as the deictic use of "left" 
and "right" was concerned. Imagine that A, B, and the 
viewer in Figure 6a are vertically aligned, with A in 
the highest position, and the viewer looking upwards
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from the lowest position. The observer could then say 
that A is above B. This will be further discussed in 
the next section. Here we consider whether the viewer 
could also say MB is in front of A", or MA is behind B" 
in this situation. The answer seems to be affirmative 
just in case B partly or wholly occludes A. One can 
look up in the air and say "the sun is behind the 
clouds", or "there are clouds in front of the sun", but 
this does require the clouds to cover the sun to some 
degree. It would, in fact, be untruthful to say that 
the sun is behind the clouds when it is not covered by 
them. The use of "above" does not have this restriction 
One can say that the sun is above the clouds even when 
there is no occlusion; it simply means that the sun is 
in a higher position than the clouds (see the next sec­
tion). If it is correct to say that the deictic use of 
"before"/"behind" requires a roughly horizontal arrange 
ment of observer and objects, just as the deictic use 
of "left"/"right", one should consider the possibility 
that these cases of occlusion involve some form of 
intrinsic use. It is not impossible that clouds are 
perceived to have intrinsic fronts (the side turned 
towards us), or that, more generally, an occluding 
object which becomes a frame of reference for the 
occluded object, acquires an intrinsic front, just as 
a moving object does. This possibility, however, will 
not be further analyzed here.
Let us now turn to normal intrinsic use of "before"/ 
"behind" and its perceptual limitations. Figure 7a 
shows a balloon which is "in front of" the chair, 
given the chairTs intrinsic orientation. How resistant 
is intrinsic use to deictic orientation cues? In 7b 
the chair has tumbled over, but the balloon has been 
displaced as well so that the same spatial relation is 
maintained between chair and balloon as in 7a. It is 
virtually impossible now to describe the situation by 
"the balloon is in front of the chair"; it is, rather, 
"over" or "above" the chair.
How can this be understood? Apparently, intrinsic use 
of "in front of" depends on the reference object being 
in its "canonical" or normal position with respect to
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Figure 7. The principle of canonical orientation for 
intrinsic use.
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Figure 7 . (continued)
the perceptual frame of orientation of the located 
object. If it isn't, the perceptual frame's orientation 
becomes the dominant one and the deictic system takes 
over. (Deictic use of "above" will be discussed in the 
next section.) A very surprising observation, however, 
is that intrinsic use is still possible for a dimension 
that is preserved under rotation of the reference 
object. An example is given in Figure 7c, where the 
chair is also in non-canonical position but with the 
front/back dimension preserved with respect to the
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perceptual frame of orientation. In this case it is 
quite normal to say that the balloon is in front of the 
chair. Here the rotated dimension is the top/bottom 
one, and Figure 7d shows that one can hardly say nthe 
balloon is above the chair” in this case, as one does 
in Figure 7e where the same spatial relation holds 
between chair and balloon.
It seems therefore warranted to conclude that intrin­
sic use of nin front ofn /"behind" and of "above"/
"below" is only possible for a dimension of the 
reference object which is not rotated with respect to 
the perceptual frame of orientation of the located 
object (if it has one).
One should now ask whether this also holds for the 
left/right dimension. Figure 7f shows a case where 
this dimension has been turned to non-canonical 
orientation. It is indeed hard or even fully inappro­
priate to say that the balloon is to the right of the 
chair in this case. In 7g, however, the 'left/right 
dimension of the chair has been preserved under rota­
tion and it seems to be all right to say that the 
balloon is to the right of the chair. Care is necessary, 
however, since this "to the right of" may be deictic 
from the point of view of the reader of these pages.
One has to observe upside-down objects in real space 
to test one's intuitions. Still it is my impression 
that "left"/"right" can be used in these cases. If 
so, the conclusion can be generalized to all three 
dimensions in the following way:
Principle of canonical orientation. For the intrinsic 
system to refer to a reference object's intrinsic di­
mension, that dimension must be in canonical position 
with respect to the perceptual frame of orientation 
of the located object.
The perceptual frame of orientation will normally be
the experienced vertical, which in its turn derives
from visual frame, vestibular or retinal orientation
information. This is the case for all discussed exam­
ples 7a trough 7g. The perceptual frame of the
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located object, furthermore, will normally be the 
perceptual frame of the referent object as well. This 
also holds for all cases 7a through 7g.
But it is possible to construct exceptions, i.e. 
cases where the perceptual frame for the located object 
is not the perceived vertical, and where the frame of 
the located object differs from the frame of the refe­
rent object. Such exceptions are depicted in Figure 
7h, which shows John's face with a fly on it, and
two others in the neighborhood. The perceptual frame 
of orientation for the first fly is John's face, where­
as the perceptual frame of orientation for John's face 
is the bed and the perceived vertical that goes with 
it. Strict application of the principle of canonical 
orientation leads one to predict that it is appropriate 
to say "there is a fly to the left of John's nose".
The intrinsic (horizontal) dimension relating the fly 
to John's nose is in canonical position with respect 
to the perceptual frame of orientation, which is John's 
face (both for the fly and for the nose).
The second fly is so close to John's head that the 
face can be the perceptual frame of orientation for 
this fly as well. Accordingly, the principle of canon­
ical orientation allows one to say "there is a fly 
above John's head". In this case the perceptual frame 
of orientation for the located object (the second fly) 
is John's head. The intrinsic (vertical) dimension 
relating the fly to John's head is in canonical 
position with respect to this frame of orientation.
But here it should be noticed that the perceptual frame 
for the referent object (John's head) is the bed, which 
has a different orientation. It is therefore crucial 
for the principle of canonical orientation to be stated 
in terms of the located object's perceptual frame of 
orientation. For fly 1 and fly 2 the perceptual frame 
of orientation is John's head. In Figure 7d, however, 
the balloon's perceptual frame of orientation is not 
the chair, but the mat on the floor. Therefore, the 
balloon is not above the chair, whereas fly 2 is above 
John's head. In other words, the referent object may 
or may not be the located object's frame of orientation.
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The determining conditions are probably Gestalt-like, 
having to do with foreground/background and size rela­
tions. They will not be further analyzed here.
The third fly, finally, is at quite a distance from 
John's head. It does not naturally take John's head as 
its perceptual frame of orientation, but the scene as a 
whole, which has a clear vertical orientation. That 
orientation is not compatible with the intrinsic ver­
tical dimension required to say ’there is a fly above 
John's head”. The principle correctly forbids the latter 
expression for a fly that far away.
It is not difficult to construct similar examples for 
the dimension "in front of" /’behind”, which is the main 
subject of this section. If John would be facing up to 
the ceiling, for instance, and there would be a fly 
just above his nose (deictically), one could felici­
tously say "there is a fly in front of John's nose".
This would predictably break down for a far-away fly.
The principle of canonical orientation has an unexpec­
ted but important consequence for the use of "above" 
and "below", as will be discussed in the next section.
5. DEICTIC AND INTRINSIC USE OF "ABOVE" AND "BELOW"
The last dimension to be considered is the vertical 
one. It differs in major respects from the previous 
two dimensions, both for the deictic and for the in­
trinsic use. Let us turn to deictic use first. The 
first observation to be made is that for deictic use 
of "above"/"below" the point of view of the viewer/ 
speaker with respect to the scene is irrelevant. Remem­
ber that we defined deictic use as an interpretation of 
spatial terms from the viewer/speaker's perspective.
If the viewer's point of view is irrelevant, what 
aspect of perspective is at stake, then, for deictic 
use of "above" and "below"? Well, it is merely the 
vertical orientation of the speaker's perspective. This 
state of affairs is depicted in Figure 8.
Let us assume that the viewer who is in position (1)
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
A A A
(3) A
A B B B
(1)< B
Figure 8. Some uses of "above" and ,rbelow".
of Figure 8a perceives balloon A as being above balloon 
B (and hence B as below A ) . If the viewer now moves to 
position (2)- and looks up, he can still say that A is 
above B, and B below A. The same holds when the viewer 
moves up to position (3) and looks down at the balloons; 
A is still above B and B below A from that point of view. 
This shows that the speaker’s point of view with respect 
to the scene is immaterial. The orientation of the 
viewer/speakerTs body is not crucially at stake either.
If he or she perceives A as being above B while standing 
upright as in Figure 8b, nothing will change in this 
respect when the viewer lies down as in Figure 8c.
What is at stake is perceived verticality, in just the 
same way as perceived horizontality was at stake in the 
deictic use of ’left" and "right". And the cues involved 
are analogous. The observer can perceive the scene as 
vertically arranged on the basis of (1) its being 
aligned with the retina’s vertical meridian, (2) its 
orientation with respect to some visual frame (horizon 
or whatever), and (3) its alignment with the vestibular
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vertical. The first type of cue works in Figure 8b, but 
not in 8c (same as Figure 3f) or in Figure 3e. The 
second type of cue is realized in Figures 8b, 8c (=3f), 
but not in Figures 3d and 3 e . The vestibular cue, 
finally, was meant to be working in Figures 8b, 8c 
(=3f) and 3e, but not in Figure 3d. None of the cues 
is indispensible; the impression of verticality can 
derive from each cue alone. In case of conflicting cues 
the situation will be very similar to the one discussed 
in connection with Table 1; an example is given in 
Figure 8d, where retinal and vestibular alignment 
are in conflict. Intuitions waver for this case, but 
we will refrain from further analyses.
The deictic system for "above"/"below" has the usual 
properties of converseness and of transitivity. That 
it is fully regular in this respect is not completely 
trivial given the fact that the viewer/speaker1s point 
of view is irrelevant in this deictic system.
Is there any intrinsic use of "above"/Mbelow"? The 
literature is unanimously affirmative on this issue.
When an object has an intrinsic top, like a person, a 
car, or a house, something can be above that object. 
Similarly, if an object has an intrinsic bottom, such 
as a chair, a plane, or a monkey, something can be 
"below" it. Still, there is good reason to doubt 
whether "above"/"below" can be used intrinsically in 
any way comparable to the intrinsic use of "left"/"right" 
or "before"/"behind", and we will show that this follows 
naturally from the principle of canonical orientation 
discussed above.
The difficulties in using "above"/"below" intrinsically 
become immediately apparent when one tries to create 
cases where converseness or transitivity is violated; 
this appears to be impossible. Figure 9a shows two 
chairs vertically aligned. Clearly, chair B is below 
chair A, but it would be highly inappropriate to say 
that "chair A is below chair B " . There is strict 
converseness here in spite of the similarity to the 
situation in Figure 5b, where converseness for "in 
front of"/"behind" was violated. It doesn’t help to 
make the situation more symmetrical, as in Figure 9b.
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Figure 9. "Above""below", and the principle of 
canonical orientation.
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(d) (e)
Figure 9 . (continued)
A
There, one can neither say that A is below B, nor that 
B is below A.
The reason why converseness (and transitivity for that 
matter) cannot be violated in these or similar cases is 
that at least one of the two objects does not occupy 
its normal position with respect to the perceptual frame, 
i.e. with respect to what is experienced as vertical.
In both situations, 9a and 9b, the principle of canonical 
orientation is violated. In Figure 9a chair A is in 
canonical position, but chair B isn't, therefore it is 
impossible to use "below B" intrinsically. In Figure 9b 
both chairs are in non-canonical position, one can 
therefore neither say "B is below A", nor "A is below B " .
Clearly, there is no solution for which both chairs are 
in canonical position with respect to a common perceptual 
frame of orientation.
But then, the consequence of the principle is far- 
reaching for all cases where the perceptual frame of 
orientation for the two objects is the perceived verti­
cal: intrinsic use of "above"/"below" is possible in 
just those cases where deictic use predicts the same 
usage of terms. In other words, as soon as the intrinsic
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use of these terms would conflict with their deictic 
use, the intrinsic system is blocked by the principle 
of canonical orientation. Another way to put this is 
to say that there is no genuine intrinsic use of 
"above" and "below" under these fairly general condi­
tions. This differs markedly from what was observed 
for the intrinsic use of "left"/"right" and "in front 
of" /"behind".
Does it also mean that intrinsic use of "above"/"below 
is generally impossible? No, the principle of canonical 
orientation allows for the loophole discussed in 
connection with Figure 7h. There it was possible to 
say that the second fly is above J o h n’s head. Similarly 
if fly 1 would position itself between J o h n’s eyes, 
one could say "there is a fly above J o h n’s nose", or 
when it lands on J oh n’s upper lip, as in Figure 9c, it 
is all right to say "there is a fly below John's nose". 
In such cases, as we discussed, John's head is the 
perceptual frame of orientation for the fly; perceived 
verticality is not at stake, and there is genuine 
intrinsic usage of "above" and "below".
But even in these cases converseness cannot be 
violated. This is again due to the principle of 
canonical orientation. Take the situation of Figure 
9c. There the fly is below John's nose, but it is 
impossible to say "John's nose is below the fly" and 
the reason is clear: the perceptual frame of orienta­
tion for the fly is John's face, and the fly is thus 
not in canonical position. A seeming counterexample 
is given in Figure 9d. Let us assume for a change that 
this is a painting of John's face in upside-down 
position. One may be able to say here "Pictor painted 
a fly under the nose", as well as "Pictor painted the 
nose under the fly". But alas, the latter expression is 
not intrinsic at all, but deictic; the fly's orienta­
tion is immaterial, as is clear from Figure 9e which 
allows equally well for the same expression.
The principle of canonical orientation requires for 
the intrinsic use of "above" and "below" that the
#
referent object is (part of) the frame of orientation 
of the located object. It is hard, if not impossible,
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to construct a perceptual scene where this relation 
holds between two objects A and B, as well as between B 
and A. That, however, will be required to violate con­
verseness (and mutatis mutandis transitivity).
The main conclusion from this section is that the use 
of the '’vertical” terms "above" and "below" is rather 
different from what was observed for the two "hori­
zontal" dimensions. Deictic use of "above" and "below" 
turned out to be independent of the user's position 
with respect to the scene; the only thing that matters 
is perceived verticality. Intrinsic use of "above" and 
"below" is extremely limited due to the principle of 
canonical orientation. Where the perceptual frame of 
orientation is perceived verticality, intrinsic usage 
is indistinguishable from deictic usage. There can 
only be genuine intrinsic use of "above" and "below" 
for other perceptual frames of orientation. But these 
latter cases are quite limited as well; it is for 
instance still impossible to violate converseness or 
transitivity.
6. CONCLUSIONS AND EPILOGUE
The use of spatial prepositions is obviously related 
to the ways in which spatial relations are experienced. 
These experiences are both perception- and memory-based, 
and often involve extensive knowledge about functional 
properties of objects. The uses of "left of"/"right of", 
"in front of" (before)/"behind", and "above"/"below" 
are almost always related to what is experienced as 
vertical. The perception of verticality is not only 
essential for deictic use, i.e. for expressing rela­
tions relative to one's own perspective, but also, 
and unexpectedly, for intrinsic use, i.e. for expressing 
relations relative to intrinsic dimensions of the 
referent objects themselves. The way in which a 
perceptual frame of orientation, in most cases expe­
rienced verticality, is involved in intrinsic usage 
was expressed as the principle of canonical orientation:
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the spatial prepositions involved can only be used 
intrinsically if the referent object is in its canoni­
cal orientation with respect to the dimension under 
concern. What is canonical depends on the perceptual 
frame of orientation for the located object; it is 
usually perceived verticality.
The way in which the impression of verticality comes 
about is an important, but for our purposes secondary 
issue. The reader is referred to Mittelstaedt (1983) 
for a thorough analysis. The phenomenological evidence 
seems to indicate that none of the three major types 
of cue (retinal orientation, visual frame information 
and vestibular information) is indispensible, and that 
the cooperation of two cue types can overrule a cue of 
the third type. But vestibular information gives the 
sense of verticality an objective quality which cannot 
be attained by means of the other two types of cue.
A further finding was that the deictic use of "left”/ 
"right" and of "in front of"/"behind", but not of 
"above"/"below" depends on the point of view of the 
observer with respect to the scene. Intrinsic use, we 
found, is also quite different for "above"/"below" than 
for the two other dimensions. The principle of canoni­
cal orientation severely restricts genuine intrinsic 
usage of "above" and "below".
A major cause for the difficulties people experience 
in the use of dimensional terms is no doubt the co­
existence of deictic and intrinsic systems of spatial 
reference. The mathematical properties of the intrinsic 
system make it, moreover, rather opaque for tasks 
involving verbal reasoning. Paradoxically, therefore, 
the most knowledge-based of the two systems is the 
least accessible to logical deduction.
This brings us, finally, to the questions of the 
functional significance (if any) of this duplicity, and 
of how language users prevent potential confusion 
between the systems. Answers to these important ques­
tions can only be very tentative, and require analyses 
surpassing the purposes of this paper. The following 
summary considerations merely serve as an epilogue.
Are there any functional reasons for languages to have
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this duplicity of systems? Not everything in language 
can be explained in terms of functional adaptation or 
selection, but if the two systems show marked differences 
in use, one would at least understand why both systems 
can coexist within a language community. Empirical 
evidence for differences in use between the systems 
is fairly limited.
The most elaborate study is Ehrich's (1984). She asked 
subjects to describe spatial arrangements of doll furni­
ture in a specially constructed little room. She arranged 
objects in such a way that deictic and intrinsic perspec­
tive could lead to opposite uses of spatial expressions. 
The major finding was a heavy preponderance of deictic 
use. Ehrich argued that the deictic system is easier 
when the task is to describe a complex spatial arrange­
ment. Intrinsic description is only possible if all 
reference objects have an intrinsic perspective, such 
as chairs and cupboards. If this is not the case (as 
with tables and lampshades) it is necessary to alternate 
between intrinsic and deictic description. An exclusive­
ly deictic strategy is more uniform then. It should, 
moreover, be remembered that the intrinsic system is 
less useful for tasks requiring verbal reasoning. It 
will, therefore, be hard for a listener to construct 
the complex spatial arrangement from an intrinsic 
description. A deictic strategy may thus have communi­
cative advantage in describing complex spatial 
arrangements.
These advantages of using the deictic system are 
plausible, but then one should wonder whether the 
intrinsic system has similar advantages in other 
situations. Wunderlich (1981) found that speakers 
preferred the intrinsic perspective when the task was 
to describe a relation between just two fixed objects, 
one of which having a prominent front side, such as a 
building. One would further expect preference for in­
trinsic use when the speaker knows that the listener 
will have difficulties in reconstructing the speaker's 
point of view with respect to the scene. It is unlikely 
that evolution has anticipated the development of 
telephone communication, but indeterminacy of the
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speaker's point of view can also arise in other 
situations; one evolutionary advantage of an acoustic 
communication system such as a spoken language is pre­
cisely that it can be used when the interlocutors are 
not within one another's sight. And these are just the 
situations where uncertainty can exist with respect to 
a speaker's perspective.
A cautionary remark on functional explanations for the 
use of deictic versus intrinsic strategies should be 
made, however. We found that people differ strongly in 
their preferences for intrinsic or deictic use. Where 
these preferences come from is unclear, but it is not 
unlikely that they relate to handedness - intrinsic use 
is somewhat more marked among (latent) left-handers 
than among right-handers (cf. Levelt 1982b).
The choice of an intrinsic or deictic way of descri­
bing spatial relations is, at any rate, multiply de­
termined, and the listener will often not be able to 
predict the speaker's choice from the non-linguistic 
context. Do speakers help their listeners to determine 
which system they are using? Sometimes a speaker marks 
the deictic usage of "left", "right”, "in front of", 
etc. by adding ”from my point of view”, or "seen from 
here". But this is the exception rather than the rule. 
There are, however, several linguistic means of sig­
nalling which system is in use. "A is to the left of 
B" is rather neutral between the systems, but "A is on 
the left of B " , or "A is on B's left" indicates intrin­
sic perspective (the latter would, for instance, be 
more appropriate in the situation of Figure lb than in 
the one of Figure la). In Dutch-, "A is aan de linker- 
kant van B" ("A is at the left side of B") will, simi­
larly, tend to be interpreted as intrinsic rather than 
deictic, since it suggests that B has a left side of 
its own. Hill (1982) argues that for French, "a la 
gauche de ma soeur" can only be interpreted intrinsi­
cally, whereas "a gauche de ma soeur" can be either 
intrinsic or deictic. And Ehrich (1983) adds the 
observation that the same distinction holds for the 
German forms "zu ihrer Linken" (only intrinsic) and 
"links von ihr" (neutral). The reader is referred to
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these publications and to Wunderlich (1981) and Levelt 
(1982b) for a discussion of other linguistic devices 
used by speakers to indicate which of the systems is in 
operation.
Clearly, these means are often insufficient for pre­
venting trouble in linguistic communication. But where 
language fails, perceptual verification may adequately 
compensate. It is a rare case where the limits of 
language and perception are simultaneously exceeded.
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